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INDEFINITELY	DESCENDING	GROUND	
Einar	Duenger	Bohn	
University	of	Agder	
[Forthcoming	in	Reality	and	its	Structure,	edited	by	R.Bliss	&	G.Priest,	OUP.]			We	often	 say	 that	 some	 facts	 obtain	 in	virtue	of	 others,	 e.g.	 that	 semantic	 facts	obtain	 in	 virtue	 of	 facts	 about	 language-use,	 or	 that	 normative	 facts	 obtain	 in	virtue	of	descriptive	facts,	or	that	mental	facts	obtain	in	virtue	of	physical	facts.	The	question	I’m	interested	in	is:	must	such	in-virtue-of	chains	eventually	end	in	some	 facts	 that	 don’t	 obtain	 in	 virtue	 of	 any	 other	 facts?	 Or	 can	 they	 go	 on	indefinitely	without	 end?1	In	 other	words	 (to	 be	 clarified	 below),	must	 the	 in-virtue-of	relation	be	well-founded?		In	what	follows,	I	argue	that	it	must	not,	and	point	to	some	reasons	for	it	even	 actually	 not	 being	 so.	 More	 specifically,	 in	 section	 1,	 I	 introduce	what	 is	perhaps	 the	 closest	 we	 get	 to	 a	 standard	 notion	 of	 the	 in-virtue-of	 relation,	namely	a	relation	of	grounding;	in	section	2,	I	argue	that	there	is	no	good	reason	to	think	that	this	relation	of	grounding	must	be	well-founded;	and	in	section	3,	I	argue	more	directly	that	it’s	not	necessarily	well-founded,	and	further	that	there	are	reasons	to	think	it’s	actually	non-well-founded.			
1.	The	standard	notion	of	grounding	Everything	 about	 in-virtue-of-talk	 can	 and	 has	 been	 questioned,	 but	 the	following	 is	 perhaps	 the	 closest	we	 get	 to	 a	 standard	 underlying	 notion	 these	days	 (Rosen,	 2010;	 Bliss	 &	 Trogdon	 2014;	 Raven	 2015).	 Saying	 that	 a	 fact	obtains	in	virtue	of	some	others	is	to	say	that	the	fact	is	grounded	in	those	other	facts.	Such	grounding	is	taken	to	be	a	one-many	relation	between	one	fact	and	a	plurality	of	(one	or	more)	facts,	imposing	what	we	might	(with	some	slack)	call	a	
strict	 partial	 order	 on	 its	 domain: 2 	no	 fact	 even	 partially	 grounds	 itself	(irreflexivity);	if	a	fact	p	is	grounded	in	some	facts	qq,	then	no	one	of	qq	is	even	partially	grounded	 in	p	 (asymmetric);	 and	 if	 a	 fact	p	 is	 grounded	 in	 some	 facts	q,rr,	and	q	is	grounded	in	some	facts	ss,	then	p	is	grounded	in	rr,ss	(transitivity).	Also,	if	a	fact	p	is	grounded	in	some	facts	qq,	then,	necessarily,	if	qq	obtain,	then	p	obtain	(necessitation);	if	a	fact	p	is	grounded	in	some	facts	qq,	then	is	not	the	case	that	 for	 any	 r,	 p	 is	 grounded	 in	 qq,r	 (non-monotonicity);	 and	 if	 a	 fact	 p	 is	grounded	 in	some	 facts	qq,	 then	qq	metaphysically	explain	p	 (explanatoriness).3	The	latter	kind	of	metaphysical	explanation	amounts	to	constitutively	explaining	what	a	fact	consists	in.	The	underlying	notion	of	grounding	is	a	notion	of	full	as																																																									1	Note	that	there	can	be	infinite	chains	that	are	limited,	but	I	wish	to	talk	about	infinite	chains	that	are	unlimited;	I	here	and	throughout	use	the	term	’indefinite’	for	that	purpose.	This	should	not	be	confused	with	the	way	’indefinite’	is	sometimes	used	in	the	philosophy	of	mathematics,	where	there	is	a	constructional	or	potential	aspect	to	it,	nor	should	it	be	confused	with	the	way	‘indefinite’	is	sometimes	used	in	debates	over	vagueness,	where	there	is	an	aspect	of,	well,	vagueness	to	it.			2	I	thus	adopt	the	so-called	predicate	approach,	not	the	operator	approach.	I	also	assume	grounding	to	be	factive.		3	One	might	here	distinguish	between,	on	the	one	hand,	grounding	being	explanation,	and	on	the	other	hand,	grounding	backing	explanation.	I	assume	the	former,	unless	noted	otherwise.	
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opposed	to	partial	grounding,	where	a	fact	p	is	partially	grounded	in	some	facts	qq	iff	there	are	some	facts	rr	such	that	p	is	fully	grounded	in	rr	and	qq	are	among	rr;	 p	 being	 fully	 grounded	 in	 rr	 being	 our	 official	 primitive,	 but	 intuitively	characterized	as	providing	a	complete	metaphysical	explanation	of	p.		I	 henceforth	 call	 this	 the	 standard	notion	 of	 grounding	 (SNG).	 I	 will	 not	further	discuss	or	defend	SNG	or	any	of	its	abovementioned	features.4	Instead,	I	will	here	simply	assume	SNG	in	order	to	argue	against	it	being	necessarily	well-founded,	in	favor	of	some	reasons	for	it	actually	being	non-well-founded.			 What	 is	 the	 notion	 of	 well-foundedness	 in	 play?	 There	 has	 been	 some	ambiguity	 in	 the	 literature	 with	 respect	 to	 what	 it	 is	 more	 exactly,	 but	 my	arguments	below	will	be	directed	at	 the	 following	notion	 identified	 in	Schaffer	(2009,	 2010),	 and	 made	 more	 precise	 in	 Dixon	 (forthcoming)	 and	 Rabin	 &	Rabern	 (forthcoming):5	every	 non-fundamental	 fact	 p	 is	 fully	 grounded	 in	 some	
fundamental	facts	qq,	where	a	fact	q	is	fundamental	iff	there	are	no	facts	rr	such	that	q	is	(partially	or	fully)	grounded	in	rr.6	I	henceforth	call	this	notion	of	well-founded	grounding	WF,	regimented	as	follows:			(WF):	∀p(∼Fp→∃qq(Fqq∧qqGp))		where	 ‘qq’	range	over	pluralities	of	(one	or	more)	facts,	 ‘p’	over	single	facts,	 ‘F’	expresses	being	fundamental,	and	‘G’	expresses	grounding.7	The	question	then	is	simply	this:	must	SNG	obey	WF?				
2.	Why	believe	grounding	must	be	well-founded?		What	are	 the	arguments	 for	WF?	There	aren’t	many.	 It	seems	to	be	more	of	an	assumed	metaphysical	axiom	 (or	metaphysical	 law)	 supported	by	 intuition.	 The	underlying	 intuition	 is	 perhaps	 most	 forcefully	 identified	 and	 endorsed	 in	Schaffer	(2009:376,	2010:37),	where	he	claims	that	‘[t]here	must	be	a	ground	of	being.	If	one	thing	exists	only	in	virtue	of	another,	then	there	must	be	something	from	 which	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 derivative	 entities	 ultimately	 derives.’	 Schaffer	(2010:62)	further	claims	that	if	there	is	no	ultimate	ground,	then	‘[b]eing	would	be	 infinitely	 deferred,	 never	 achieved.’	 Finally,	 Schaffer	 (forthcoming:	 section	4.5)	 claims	 that	 ‘[g]rounding	must	 be	well-founded	 because	 a	 grounded	 entity	inherits	its	reality	from	its	ground,	and	where	there	is	inheritance	there	must	be	a	source.’	And	(ibid):	 ‘the	grounded	exists	 in	virtue	of	 its	ground.	This	 is	why	a	
																																																								4	For	references	to	further	discussions	on	each	of	these	features,	see	Bliss	&	Trogdon	(2014)	and	Raven	(2015).	For	a	general	criticism	of	an	overall	notion	of	grounding,	see	Wilson	(2014)	and	Koslicki	(2015).	See	also	Dasgupta	(2014a),	where	grounding	is	argued	to	be	many-many,	rather	than	one-many.	5	Note	that	the	following	notion	of	well-foundedness	is	not	the	mathematical	(set-
theoretical)	notion	of	well-foundedness.	The	above	well-foundedness	of	grounding	is	a	distinctively	metaphysical	notion.	Note	also	that	this	is	just	one	among	several	notions	of	metaphysical	well-foundedness.	Though	I	think	much	of	what	I	go	on	to	say	does	not	hinge	on	this	particular	notion,	my	conclusions	should	be	hedged	accordingly.			6	See	Dasgupta	(2014b)	for	some	problems	with	the	above	definition	of	fundamentality.	Fortunately,	those	problems	will	not	affect	my	overall	argument	in	this	paper.		7	I	take	’F’	to	be	distributive,	but	see	fn.13,	section	2	below.		
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source	 of	 reality	 is	 needed,	 in	 order	 for	 there	 to	 be	 anything	 to	 transfer.’8	Cameron	(2008:6)	too	finds	Schaffer’s	intuition	appealing	(though	he	ultimately	rejects	 that	 it	 must	 hold	 in	 favor	 of	 it	 only	 most	 likely	 actually	 holding	 for	methodological	reasons):	‘if	we	never	reach	a	bottom	level,	then	it	is	hard	to	see	why	there	are	any	complex	objects	at	all.’9			 The	 intuition	 thus	 seems	 to	 be	 something	 like	 this:	 reality,	 or	 being	 is	
transferred	 from	 the	ground	 to	 the	grounded,	 so	all	 facts	gain	their	being	 from	their	ground,	so	if	there	is	no	bottom	ground,	there	is	nowhere	from	which	the	transfer	 of	 being	 initially	 comes,	 nowhere	 from	 which	 to	 gain	 being	 to	 begin	with,	so	SNG	must	obey	WF	on	pain	of	there	not	being	any	(being	to)	facts	at	all.10			Here	 is	 one	 way	 to	 make	 the	 intuition	 into	 an	 argument	 for	 WF:	 by	definition,	something	is	a	fundamental	fact	if	and	only	if	it	has	no	ground;	hence,	if	 there	 are	 no	 fundamental	 facts,	 all	 facts	 have	 ground;	 and	 if	 all	 facts	 have	ground,	 there	are	no	 facts;	but	obviously	 there	are	some	 facts;	hence	 there	are	some	fundamental	facts.	Let’s	call	this	the	argument	for	WF.		The	 argument	 is	 valid;	 the	main	 question	 is	why	we	 should	 believe	 the	next	to	last	premise:	if	all	facts	have	ground,	there	are	no	facts?	I	for	one	simply	don’t	feel	the	intuitive	pull	here.11	An	intuition	pump	might	come	by	the	more	or	less	 dynamical	 metaphors	 often	 used	 to	 explain	 the	 grounding	 relation:	 the	ground	 transmits	 its	 being	 to	 the	 grounded,	 the	 grounded	 gains,	 achieves,	 or	
derives	 its	 being	 from	 the	 ground.	 So,	 if	 there	 is	 no	 bottom	 ground,	 there	 is	nothing	 that	 can	 thus	 transmit	 being	 to	 the	 grounded,	 nothing	 from	which	 the	grounded	can	 thus	gain,	 achieve	or	derive	 its	being.	The	dynamical	 talk	makes	this	sound	somewhat	plausible.	It’s	as	if	you	are	to	fill	up	a	swimming	pool	by	the	use	 of	 a	 hose:	 if	 nothing	 comes	out	 of	 that	 hose,	 then	of	 course	 the	 swimming	pool	will	not	be	filled	up.	Or,	at	least	in	my	experience,	if	I	don’t	at	some	definite	point	 start	writing	my	 paper,	 it	 just	won’t	 be	written.	 But	 the	 problem	 is	 that	grounding	 is	 nothing	 like	 such	 dynamical	 processes.	 There	 is	 no	 such	 definite	
dynamical	starting	point	of	 the	grounding	chain.	Grounding	 is	 like	a	synchronic,	
static	mathematical	 relation	 (like	 in	 arithmetic),	 not	 like	 a	diachronic,	dynamic	
physical	 relation	 (like	 in	 thermodynamics,	 or	 action	 theory).	 Grounding	 is	 an	explanation	of	what	the	obtaining	of	a	fact	consists	in,	atemporally;	grounding	is	not	an	explanation	of	the	causal	history	of	that	fact	(cf.	Fine,	2001,	2012;	Rosen,	2010).	So,	any	intuitive	pull	we	might	feel	from	the	dynamical	metaphors	is	of	no	help	in	a	defense	of	SNG	necessarily	obeying	WF.			 Now,	before	I	look	at	other	ways	to	try	to	defend	the	above	premise	in	the	argument	 for	 WF,	 consider	 the	 argument	 that	 simply	 drops	 it:	 by	 definition,	something	 is	 a	 fundamental	 fact	 iff	 it	 has	 no	 ground;	 hence,	 if	 there	 are	 no																																																									8	Thomas	Aquinas’	(1266-8/1993:200-202),	in	his	five	ways	towards	the	necessary	existence	of	God,	shares	Schaffer’s	intuition	concerning	the	need	for	a	source	of	being.	In	general,	there	are	great	similarities	between	Aquinas’	foundationalism	in	his	five	ways	and	Schaffer’s	foundationalism	with	respect	to	grounding.		9	Note:	Schaffer	doesn’t	and	Cameron	might	not	endorse	the	full	package	of	SNG,	but	officially	I’m	here	only	interested	in	whether	SNG	in	particular	must	be	well-founded	(though	I	do	believe	my	arguments	generalize	to	other	notions	of	grounding	as	well).		10	For	more	on	this	picture	of	transference,	inheritance,	or	source	of	being,	see	Trogdon	(ms).	I	treat	the	notions	of	reality	and	being	as	interchangeable,	but	try	to	keep	the	notion	of	existence	separate;	though	in	fact	nothing	hinges	on	this	for	present	purposes.		11	And,	in	any	case,	why	believe	my	intuitions	match	deep	metaphysical	truths?		
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fundamental	 facts,	 all	 facts	 have	 ground.	 Now	 that	 is	 a	 solid	 conditional	argument	for	what	I	henceforth	call	indefinitely	descending	ground:		(IDG):	∀p∃qq(qqGp)		Given	 our	 assumption	 that	 G	 is	 a	 strict	 partial	 order	 as	 per	 SNG,	 IDG	 gives	 us	infinite,	 non-ending	 chains	 of	 grounding.12	Given	 some	 very	 minor,	 plausible	assumptions,	 IDG	 is	 incompatible	 with	WF.	 Proof:	 assume	WF	 and	 ∼Fp.	 Then,	
∃qq(Fqq∧qqGp).	Let	q1	be	one	of	those	qq	and	assume	the	distributivity	of	F.	It	then	follows	that	Fq1;	but	by	definition	of	fundamentality,	∀p(∼Fp↔∃ss(ssGp));	hence	∼∃ss(ssGq1);	but	by	IDG,	∃qq(qqGq1);	hence,	contradiction.	Now,	the	minor	assumptions	that	fundamentality	is	a	distributive	property	and	the	definition	of	fundamentality	 is	 here	 taken	 for	 granted	 (though	 neither	 one	 is	 beyond	dispute13),	so	WF	and	IDG	are	incompatible.		Now,	one	way	to	indirectly	defend	the	controversial	premise	in	the	above	argument	for	WF	(i.e.	the	premise	that	if	all	facts	have	ground,	there	are	no	facts)	is	to	argue	that	IDG	amounts	to	an	appropriately	vicious	infinite	regress.	I	take	it	a	
benign	infinite	regress	won’t	do	(for	example,	it	‘s	not	a	problem	that	we	have:	‘s’	is	true;	‘’s’	is	true’	is	true;	‘’’s’	is	true’	is	true’	is	true;	and	so	on	ad	infinitum).	I	also	take	it	a	mere	infinite	regress	won’t	do	(for	example,	it’s	not	a	problem	that	zero	has	 infinitely	many	successors).	Rather,	 IDG	must	amount	 to	an	 infinite	vicious	regress,	and	it	must	be	of	the	appropriate	kind	to	support	the	argument	for	WF.	But	what	could	such	an	appropriately	infinite	vicious	regress	be	in	this	case?			 I	 can	 think	of	 at	 least	 two	 candidates	 (adapted	 from	Nolan,	 2001;	Bliss,	2013).	The	first	candidate	deals	with	reductive	explanations.	Now,	 ‘reduction’	 is	said	in	many	ways,	but	assume	SNG	is	reductive	in	the	sense	that	if	qqGp,	then	qq	
explain	 away	 p	 as	 being	 in	 some	 sense	 non-real.	 Given	 IDG,	 one	 would	 then	explain	away	 facts,	but	never	explain	 them	away	 in	 terms	of	 something	 that	 is	not	thus	further	explained	away.	One	might	then	get	the	feeling	that	every	fact	p	is	 somehow	 explained	 away,	 but	 into	 nothing,	 so	 to	 speak;	 that	 every	 fact	 is	‘infinitely	deferred,	never	achieved’	(Schaffer,	2010:6314).		But,	first,	why	think	grounding	is	thus	explanatorily	reductive?	It	is	not	a	common	 view	 of	 grounding	 (Fine,	 2001,	 2012;	 Schaffer,	 2009,	 2010;	 Rosen,	2010).	In	fact,	much	initial	motivation	for	appealing	to	grounding	is	to	be	able	to	truly	say	that	some	things	obtain	without	thereby	admitting	that	they	are	as	real	as	all	other	things	obtaining	(Schaffer,	2009).	For	example,	we	want	to	say	–	truly																																																									12	Cf.	Bliss	(2013);	Tahko	(2014);	Morganti	(forthcoming).	With	G	being	transitive	but	failing	irreflexivity,	we	could	have	loops	of	ground;	see	Bliss	(2014).	I’m	not	in	principle	opposed	to	such	loops,	but	SNG	is	for	present	purposes	assumed	to	be	irreflexive,	so,	by	assumption,	no	loops.		13	If	there	are	fundamental	facts,	but	fundamentality	is	a	collective	property,	things	will	look	slightly	different.	Though	that	is	an	interesting	idea,	I	will	ignore	it	in	what	follows	since	I	believe	that	there	most	likely	are	no	fundamental	facts.	See	Dasgupta	(2014b)	for	criticism	of	the	notion	of	fundamentality.		14	Though	note	that	to	the	extent	one	is	concerned	with	grounding	objects	rather	than	facts,	the	notion	of	grounding	seems	to	fail	the	assumption	of	explanatoriness,	in	which	case	one	loses	this	particular	defense	of	his	intuition.	One	must	then,	as	e.g.	Schaffer	(forthcoming)	does,	appeal	to	a	notion	of	grounding	that	backs	explanation,	without	grounding	itself	being	explanation.		
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–	 that	 there	are	 tables	and	chairs,	but	not	 thereby	admit	 that	 tables	and	chairs	are	as	fundamental	as	particles.	So,	as	far	as	I	can	tell,	a	proponent	of	IDG	could	and	should	simply	reject	that	grounding	is	explanatorily	reductive.	Grounding	is	explanatory,	but	non-reductive.15	Grounding	metaphysically	explains	a	given	fact	in	 terms	 of	 other	 facts,	 but	 grounding	 does	 not	 thus	 explain	 away	 that	 fact	 as	somehow	non-real.16		Second,	assume	grounding	is	thus	explanatorily	reductive.	Then	the	above	argument,	 corresponding	 intuition	 and	 supposed	 vicious	 regress	 get	 things	backwards.	By	SNG,	the	grounded	has	its	being	(or	nature,	or	existence)	in	virtue	of	 the	 ground.	 But	 if	 so,	 the	 ground	 surely	 cannot	 have	 less	 being	 than	 the	grounded.	Either	 the	ground	has	 the	same	degree	of	being	as	 the	grounded,	or	the	ground	has	more	being	than	the	grounded.	But	then,	as	we	approach	infinity	towards	ground,	we	either	stay	with	the	same	degree	of	being,	or	we	approach	infinite	being!	In	neither	case	is	being	infinitely	deferred,	never	achieved,	as	per	Schaffer’s	intuition.	If	anything,	being	is	always	deferred,	but	infinitely	achieved!	So,	 if	 grounding	 is	 reductive,	we’re	not	 explaining	 facts	 away	only	 to	approach	nothingness,	but	rather	we’re	explaining	facts	away	in	terms	of	other	facts	that	have	equal	or	more	being.17		Now,	one	might	object	 that	 infinite	being	makes	no	sense,	 so	at	best	we	have	 an	 equal	 degree	 of	 being	 along	 the	 grounding	 chain.	 But	 then,	 as	 we	 go	down	the	grounding	chain,	being	 is	 infinitely	deferred,	never	achieved	because	without	WF	 that	 equal	 degree	 of	 being	 is	 zero!	 But,	 of	 course,	 that	 would	 be	begging	the	question.	It	 is	very	 important	not	to	confuse	various	perspectives	of	 the	supposed	explanatoriness	involved	in	SNG	(cf.	Bliss,	2013;	Morganti,	forthcoming).	Assume	IDG,	its	corresponding	chains	of	grounding,	and	the	corresponding	totality	of	all	such	chains	of	grounding,	which	I’ll	call	the	chains	of	being.18	We	then	have	three	questions,	 what	 we	might	 call	 a	 local,	 a	 regional,	 and	 a	 global	 question.	 Local	
Question	 (LQ):	 for	 any	 fact	 p,	 what	 grounds	 p?	 Regional	 Question	 (RQ):	 what	
																																																								15	One	might	of	course	still	accept	Rosen’s	(2010:123)	principle	that	if	p	reduces	to	qq,	then	qqGp,	without	accepting	that	grounding	is	reductive	in	the	above	sense.	16	Note	that	this	latter	notion	of	being	real	is	not	necessarily	Fine’s	(2001)	notion	of	being	real.	Note	also	that	to	the	extent	that	Fine’s	notion	of	being	real	is	taken	as	a	guide	(though	no	guarantee)	to	being	fundamental,	Fine’s	(2001:26)	definition	of	reduction	is	incompatible	with	IDG.		17	See	also	Fine	(2001:27	and	fn.38).	Morganti	(forthcoming)	argues	that	rather	than	disappearing	as	per	the	above	intuition,	being	emerges	from	infinite	grounding	chains.	Cameron	(2008:10)	too	raises	a	similar	point:	’Why	could	not	everything	get	a	bit	more	real	as	we	progress	down	the	chain,	without	anything	being	wholly	real?’	But	his	intuition	’rules	this	out’,	though,	as	he	himself	points	out,	’this	just	is	the	intuition	that	there	must	be	a	fundamental	level.’	Note	that	an	appeal	to	an	analogy	with	causation	doesn’t	seem	to	help	here:	there	seems	to	be	no	more	to	an	effect	than	what’s	in	its	cause(s).	In	fact,	since	WF	postulates	unexplained	facts	at	the	bottom,	it	seems	to	me	it’s	ultimately	WF	that	fails	to	explain	the	being	of	our	facts,	not	IDG.	See	section	3	below.	See	also	Tahko	(2014).		18	Recall,	grounding	is	supposed	to	impose	a	partial	order,	not	a	total	order,	so	the	chains	of	being	need	not	be	a	single	connected	grounding	chain,	but	can	be	many	disconnected	ones.			
		 6	
grounds	 the	 chain	of	 grounding	of	p?19	Global	Question	(GQ):	what	 grounds	 the	chains	of	being?	A	proponent	of	IDG	should	commit	to	answering	LQ,	and	might	or	 might	 not	 commit	 to	 answering	 RQ	 (cf.	 Dasgupta,	 2014b).	 But	 should	 she	commit	to	answering	GQ?	No!	Given	SNG+IDG,	GQ	is	incoherent.	First	of	all,	the	chains	of	being	is	presumably	a	plurality	of	facts,	not	a	single	fact,	which	is	what	it	 needs	 to	 be	 to	 be	 grounded	 as	 per	 SNG.	 Second,	 assume	 the	 chains	 of	 being	amount	to	an	all-encompassing	global	fact;	call	it	g.	Then,	by	IDG,	there	are	some	facts	that	ground	g;	but,	by	SNG	being	a	strict	partial	order,	those	facts	must	be	distinct	 from	 g;	 so	 g	 is	 not	 an	 all-encompassing	 global	 fact,	 contradicting	 the	initial	 assumption.	 So,	 we	 might	 put	 it	 like	 this:	 each	 fact	 individually	 has	 a	ground,	 but	 all	 facts	 taken	 together	 (speaking	 unrestrictedly!)	 cannot	 have	 a	ground.		One	 might	 object	 that	 by	 invoking	 many-many	 grounding	 (as	 per	Dasgupta,	2014a),	one	has	the	logical	resources	to	answer	GQ.	But	note	first	that	one	is	then	changing	the	assumptions	of	the	argument,	by	switching	from	SNG	to	another	slightly	different	notion	of	grounding,	call	it	SNG*.	Second,	that	might	be	the	right	thing	to	do,	perhaps	for	independent	reasons	too,	but,	given	IDG,	it	does	not	 help	 answering	 GQ.	 Assume	 the	 chains	 of	 being	 amount	 to	 an	 all-encompassing	plural	global	fact;	call	it	gg.	Then,	by	IDG,	there	are	some	facts	that	ground	gg;	but,	by	SNG*	being	a	strict	partial	order,	those	facts	must	be	distinct	from	 gg;	 so	 gg	 is	 not	 an	 all-encompassing	 plural	 global	 fact,	 contradicting	 the	initial	assumption.	So,	this	time,	we	might	put	 it	 like	this:	each	fact	 individually	has	 a	 ground,	 but	 all	 facts	 taken	 collectively	 (speaking	 unrestrictedly!)	 cannot	have	a	ground.	Neither	 does	 it	 help	 to	 invoke	 Fine’s	 (2012)	 distinction	 between	 being	ungrounded	 and	 being	 zero-grounded.	 We	 might	 put	 the	 distinction	 like	 this:	something	is	zero-grounded	iff	it	is	grounded,	but	in	the	empty	collection	of	facts,	and	something	is	ungrounded	iff	it	is	not	grounded	at	all.	Now,	SNG	is	assumed	to	be	 explanatory,	 so	while	being	ungrounded	amounts	 to	having	no	 explanation,	being	 zero-grounded	 amounts	 to	 having	 an	 explanation,	 but	 in	 terms	 of	 the	empty	collection	of	facts.	But,	I	say,	a	metaphysical	explanation	of	a	fact	in	terms	of	 the	 empty	 collection	 of	 facts	 is	 no	metaphysical	 explanation	 of	 that	 fact,	 at	least	not	as	per	SNG.	Saying	that	the	obtaining	of	a	fact	p	consists	in	the	obtaining	of	the	empty	collection	of	facts,	is	not	metaphysically	explaining	p	unless	p	is	the	empty	fact.	So,	by	trying	to	answer	GQ	by	invoking	zero-ground,	one	either	fails	due	to	not	being	appropriately	explanatory,	or	one	must	be	invoking	a	different	notion	 of	 grounding	 from	 SNG.20	So,	 assuming	 SNG,	 invoking	 Fine’s	 (2012)	distinction	 between	 being	 ungrounded	 and	 being	 zero-grounded	 just	 does	 not	help,	at	 least	not	on	pain	of	changing	the	assumptions.	Of	course,	maybe	that	is	the	right	thing	to	do	in	the	end,	but	not	for	present	purposes.21																																																										19	Note	that	RQ	is	not	the	question	of	what	grounds	a	grounding	fact.	The	question	of	what	grounds	a	grounding	fact	falls	under	LQ.			20	Presumably,	one	could	do	better	with	respect	to	zero-grounding	by	switching	to	an	operator	approach	towards	G,	rather	than	our	predicate	approach.	But	then,	again,	one	is	moving	away	from	SNG,	which	is	our	present	concern.		21	See	Litland	(forthcoming)	for	some	further	work	on	zero-grounding.	Unfortunately,	Litland’s	assumptions	are	difference	from	ours	(e.g.	G	is	a	non-factive	operator),	so	his	account	does	not	obviously	help	answering	GQ.	Despite	his	insistence	to	the	contrary,	I	
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Admittedly,	 the	 above	 argument	 is	 quick,	 but,	 whether	 or	 not	 it’s	 too	quick,	there	is	another	more	decisive	argument	for	not	invoking	zero-grounding	to	 assist	 us	 with	 respect	 to	 GQ:	 by	 our	 present	 assumptions,	 it	 entails	necessitism,	 the	view	that	all	actual	 facts	are	necessary.22	Assume	the	chains	of	being	 are	 zero-grounded,	 i.e.	 grounded	 in	 the	 empty	 collection	 of	 facts.	 Then,	since	 the	 empty	 collection	 of	 facts	 necessarily	 exists,	 by	 the	 assumption	 of	necessitation,	 all	 actual	 facts	 exist	 necessarily;	 hence	 necessitism.	 But,	 I	 claim,	necessitism	is	false,	so	the	chains	of	being	are	not	zero-grounded.			So,	 I	 conclude,	whether	 grounding	 is	 reductive	 or	not,	 by	 IDG,	 each	 fact	has	a	ground,	and	hence	a	metaphysical	explanation	in	terms	of	some	other	facts,	and	 no	 fact	 is	 thereby	 lost	 into	 nothingness;	 i.e.	 no	 fact	 is	 ‘infinitely	 deferred,	never	 achieved’.	 Given	 IDG	 (and	 SNG,	 or	 SNG*),	 there	 is	 no	 sensible	 question	about	 what	 the	 ground	 of	 being	 as	 such	 is;	 the	 global	 question	 (GQ)	 of	 what	grounds	the	chains	of	being	themselves	is	incoherent.			 The	point	 that	LQ	 (and	maybe	RQ)	 is	what	we	want	answered,	with	GQ	being	incoherent,	resembles	a	point	made	by	Hume	(1779:IX)	in	his	objection	to	cosmological	arguments	for	the	existence	of	God.	According	to	Hume,	if	one	has	explained	each	step	in	a	perhaps	infinite	causal	chain,	there	is	nothing	more	to	be	explained,	 and	 in	 particular	 no	 need	 to	 postulate	 a	 first	 cause	 to	 explain	 it	 all.	Now,	 Pruss	 (2012:81-82)	 objects	 to	Hume	 by	 the	 following	 example.	 Consider	the	flight	of	a	cannonball	between	12:00	and	12:01,	and	let	pt	be	the	state	of	the	cannonball	at	time	t.	Let	p	be	the	conjunction	of	all	pt	such	that	12:00<t<12:01.	Then	each	pt	might	explain	 its	successor	pt+,	 such	that	each	pt	 is	explained,	but	still,	Pruss	claims,	the	flight	of	the	cannonball	itself	is	not	explained,	so	Hume	is	wrong.		Is	 there	 a	 similar	 objection	 in	 the	 vicinity	with	 respect	 to	 IDG?	No.	 The	flight	case	is	misleading	because	there	is	an	external	perspective	on	the	flight	of	the	cannonball,	but	there	isn’t	any	such	external	perspective	on	all	the	chains	of	being	 (witnessed	 by	 GQ	 being	 incoherent).	 So,	 adapted	 to	 our	 global	 case	 of	grounding,	I	think	Hume	is	right.	The	 second	 candidate	 for	 a	 vicious	 regress	 in	 indirect	 support	 of	 the	controversial	premise	in	the	argument	for	WF	is	similar	to	the	prior	one	in	terms	of	 reductive	 explanations,	 but	 claims	 that	 there	 is	 another	 kind	 of	 failure.	Whether	 grounding	 is	 reductive	 or	 not,	 the	 supposed	 failure	 can	 be	 seen	 by	analogy	with	the	toy	example	of	the	homunculus	theory	of	perception	(Cf.	Nolan,	2001;	Bliss,	2013).	Suppose	someone	attempts	 to	explain	 the	perception	of	 the	fact	that	p	as	follows.	There	are	outside	signals	coming	into	the	eye,	received	by	a	homunculus	sitting	on	the	inside	of	the	eye,	who	interprets	the	signals	as	being	of	the	fact	that	p	before	sending	them	off	to	the	brain.	How	does	the	homunculus	so	interpret	the	signals?	Well,	there	is	another	homunculus	sitting	inside	the	first	homunculus,	who	interprets	the	signals	as	being	of	the	fact	that	p	before	sending	them	off	to	the	first	homunculus.	How	does	the	second	homunculus	so	interpret	the	 signals?	 Well,	 there	 is	 a	 third	 homunculus	 sitting	 inside	 the	 second	homunculus…		and	so	on	ad	infinitum.	Obviously,	here	the	supposed	explanation																																																																																																																																																															also	fail	to	see	how	Litland’s	account	of	zero-grounding	is	metaphysically	explanatory,	but	let	that	be	as	it	may.	22	I	owe	this	argument	to	Jon	Litland,	though	of	course	he	is	not	to	blame.	Note	that	the	necessitism	in	play	is	not	to	be	confused	with	our	earlier	assumption	of	necessitation.		
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of	 the	 perception	 that	 p	 fails;	 we	 might	 plausibly	 blame	 the	 explanation	 for	creating	a	vicious	regress.			 Now,	the	worry	this	time	is	not	so	much	that	we	explain	away	facts	into	nothingness,	 but	 that	 the	 explanation	 fails	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 having	 to	 re-ask	 the	same	question	with	 respect	 to	 the	 same	kind	of	 object	 over	 and	over	 again	ad	
infinitum.	The	explanation	thus	gets	us	nowhere,	so	to	speak.	But	there	is	no	such	problem	in	our	case	of	grounding.	IDG	does	not	create	any	such	vicious	regress.	If	qqGp,	then,	by	SNG,	qq	provide	a	full	metaphysical	explanation	of	p,	so	there	is	no	further	question	about	what	grounds	p.	So,	we	do	get	somewhere.	We	do	of	course	 have	 the	 further	 question	 of	 what	 grounds	 the	 facts	 among	 qq	 (not	 to	mention	what	grounds	the	fact	that	qqGp),	and	so	on	ad	infinitum,	but	that	is	not	analogous	with	 the	 homunculus	 theory	 of	 perception.	 In	 the	 homunculus-case,	one	 has	 the	 same	 content	 over	 and	 over	 again,	 but	 not	 so	 in	 the	 IDG-case	 of	grounding.	 To	make	 the	 homunculus-case	more	 analogous	 to	 the	 IDG-case,	we	would	have	to	explain	the	perception	that	p	in	terms	of	the	first	homunculus,	but	then	explain	this	homunculus	in	terms	of	something	non-homunculus-like,	or	at	least	 something	 different-hounculus-like	 and	 so	 on	 ad	 infinitum.	 But	 then	 the	reason	 for	 the	 initial	 failure	 in	explanation	has	gone	away.	The	analogy	simply	doesn’t	hold	up	to	scrutiny.		In	general,	we	might	say	that	an	infinite	regress	is	vicious	if	something	we	want	to	explain	cannot	be	explained	because	of	the	regress	(Nolan,	2001;	Bliss,	2013),	so,	 in	the	particular	case	of	grounding,	 IDG’s	 infinite	regress	 is	vicious	if	something	we	want	to	ground	cannot	be	grounded	because	of	it.	But,	as	we	have	just	 seen,	 given	 IDG,	 it	makes	 no	 sense	 to	 ask	 for	 the	 ground	 of	 the	 chains	 of	being	 themselves,	 i.e.	 there	 is	no	“global”	 fact	 to	be	grounded,	and	by	 IDG	each	fact	is	grounded,	so	it	is	not	the	case	that	some	fact	cannot	be	grounded	because	of	IDG’s	regress.23		I	 conclude	 that	 IDG	does	not	 create	a	vicious	 regress	of	 the	appropriate	kind,	 and	 hence	 a	 defense	 of	 the	 controversial	 premise	 (that	 if	 all	 facts	 have	ground,	 there	 are	 no	 facts)	 based	 on	 IDG	 creating	 a	 vicious	 regress	 of	 the	appropriate	kind	fails.		
3.	Against	grounding	being	well-founded	Here	is	what	I	take	to	be	the	best	argument	for	why	SNG	need	not	obey	WF,	i.e.	why	it	is	possible	that	SNG	is	true,	but	WF	is	false.		First,	 assume	 proper	 parthood	 is	 a	 strict	 partial	 order,	 and	 that	 the	concrete	 world	 U	 is	 gunky:	 every	 entity	 in	 U	 has	 a	 proper	 part.24	Then	 U	 is	
indefinitely	divisible	 into	proper	parts,	 i.e.	unlimitedly	so	 (so	U	contains	neither	extended	nor	unextended	mereological	atoms).	Assume	further	that	for	any	x,	if	x	is	part	of	(or	in)	U,	then	the	fact	that	x	exists	is	(at	least	partly)	grounded	in	the	fact	 that	 its	 proper	 parts	 exist.	 Then	 we	 have	 in	 effect	 a	 needed	 case	 of	 IDG,	contradicting	WF	 (cf.	 Rosen,	 2010:116).	 So,	 if	 SNG	must	 obey	WF,	 then	 either	proper	 parthood	 is	 not	 a	 strict	 partial	 order	 or	 such	 a	 gunky	 scenario	 is	
																																																								23	See	also	Schaffer	(forthcoming:section	4.5).	My	arguments	above	amounts	to	a	rejection	of	Schaffer’s	”transfer	model”	in	the	sense	that	I	argue	there	is	no	need	for	a	source	of	being.		24	On	gunk,	see	e.g.	Sider	(1993),	Schaffer	(2003),	and	Arntzenius	(2008).		
		 9	
metaphysically	impossible;	but	proper	parthood	is	a	strict	partial	order	and	such	a	gunky	scenario	is	metaphysically	possible,	so,	SNG	need	not	obey	WF.			Second,	 assume	 proper	 parthood	 is	 a	 strict	 partial	 order,	 and	 that	 the	concrete	 world	 U	 is	 junky:	 every	 entity	 in	 U	 is	 a	 proper	 part.25	Then	 U	 is	
indefinitely	extendable	along	the	proper	parthood	chains,	i.e.	unlimitedly	so	(so	U	contains	no	maximal	 fusion	 that	 is	not	 a	proper	part).	Assume	 further	 that	 for	any	x	and	y	in	U,	 if	x	 is	a	proper	part	of	y,	then	the	fact	that	x	exists	is	(at	 least	partly)	grounded	in	the	fact	that	y	exists.26	Then	we	have	in	effect	another	case	of	IDG,	contradicting	WF.	So,	if	SNG	must	obey	WF,	then	either	proper	parthood	is	not	a	strict	partial	order	or	such	a	 junky	scenario	is	metaphysically	impossible;	but	 proper	 parthood	 is	 a	 strict	 partial	 order	 and	 such	 a	 junky	 scenario	 is	metaphysically	possible	(Bohn,	2009b),	so	SNG	need	not	obey	WF.		 Finally,	 assume	 proper	 parthood	 is	 a	 strict	 partial	 order,	 and	 that	 the	concrete	world	U	is	hunky:	every	entity	in	U	both	is	and	has	a	proper	part.27	Then	U	is	indefinitely	extendable	and	indefinitely	divisible	along	the	proper	parthood	chains	(so	U	contains	neither	a	minimal	nor	a	maximal	entity).	Then,	whichever	mereological	direction	a	chain	of	grounding	goes	(though	of	course	it	cannot	go	in	both	directions	at	once!),	we	have	in	effect	another	case	of	IDG,	contradicting	WF.	So,	if	SNG	must	obey	WF,	then	either	proper	parthood	is	not	a	strict	partial	order	 or	 such	 a	 hunky	 scenario	 is	 metaphysically	 impossible;	 but	 proper	parthood	 is	 a	 strict	 partial	 order	 and	 such	 a	 hunky	 scenario	 is	metaphysically	possible	(Bohn,	2009b,	2012),	so	SNG	need	not	obey	WF.	These	three	arguments	seem	very	good	to	me;	in	fact,	they	seem	as	good	as	arguments	get	in	philosophy.	Rhetorically:	why	exactly	is	a	gunky,	a	junky	or	a	hunky	 scenario	metaphysically	 impossible?	 I	 know	 of	no	 convincing	 reason	 to	believe	they	are.28,29		Assuming	SNG	appropriately	 tracks	 the	mereological	hierarchy	as	above	(which	 is	 no	minor	 assumption,	 but	we	 only	 need	 its	mere	 possibility	 here),	 I	conclude	that	the	claim	that	SNG	must	obey	WF	is	simply	false.		In	fact,	there	are	even	some	(highly	defeasible!)	reasons	to	believe	that	the	concrete	world	 is	actually	 hunky.	We	 are	 faced	with	 a	 general	 cosmic	 pattern	that	so	far	has	no	clear	end	points	in	sight.	Starting	high	up,	the	universe	is	partly	composed	of	clusters	of	galaxies;	the	clusters	of	galaxies	are	partly	composed	of	galaxies;	the	galaxies	are	partly	composed	of	solar	systems;	the	solar	systems	are	partly	composed	of	planets	and	stars;	the	planets	and	stars	are	partly	composed	of	 various	 chemicals;	 the	 various	 chemicals	 are	 partly	 composed	of	molecules;	the	 various	 molecules	 are	 partly	 composed	 of	 atoms;	 the	 atoms	 are	 partly	composed	 of	 electrons,	 protons	 and	 neutrons;	 the	 protons	 and	 neutrons	 are																																																									25	On	junk,	see	Schaffer	(2010)	and	Bohn	(2009a;	2009b;	2012;	ms).		26	See	Schaffer	(2010),	where	this	direction	of	grounding	is	defended.	If	junk	is	possible,	Schaffer’s	version	of	WF	in	terms	of	priority	monism	fails	to	be	necessarily	true	(Bohn,	2012).		27	On	hunk,	see	Bohn	(2009b;	2012).	28	Arguably,	Sider’s	(2011,	2013)	reasons	rest	on	a	too	deflationary	notion	of	modality.		29	In	Bohn	(2009a,	2009b,	2012)	I	argued	that	if	composition	is	not	identity	and	gunk	is	possible,	then	junk	is	possible.	I	now	believe	(i)	that	composition	is	identity	and	entails	unrestricted	composition	(Bohn,	2009c,	2011,	2014);	(ii)	that	hunk	is	possible,	likely	actual,	if	not	necessary;	(iii)	that	plural	comprehension	is	false;	and	(iv)	that	because	of	(iii),	(i)	and	(ii)	are	compatible	(Bohn,	ms).		
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partly	composed	of	various	quarks;	the	various	quarks	are	partly	composed	of	…	to	 be	 continued?	 Starting	 low	 down,	 the	 various	 quarks	 partly	 compose	 the	protons	 and	 neutrons;	 the	 electrons,	 protons	 and	 neutrons	 partly	 compose	atoms;	 the	 atoms	 partly	 compose	 molecules;	 the	 molecules	 partly	 compose	chemicals;	the	chemicals	partly	compose	planets	and	stars;	the	planets	and	stars	partly	 compose	 solar	 systems;	 the	 solar	 systems	 partly	 compose	 galaxies;	 the	galaxies	 partly	 compose	 clusters	 of	 galaxies;	 the	 clusters	 of	 galaxies	 partly	compose	 super-clusters	 of	 galaxies;	 the	 super-clusters	 of	 galaxies	 partly	compose	…	to	be	continued?	Or	perhaps	they	partly	compose	the	universe,	which	in	 turn	 partly	 compose	 a	 multiverse;30	which	 in	 turn	 partly	 compose	 …	 to	 be	continued?			As	science	has	progressed,	we	have	again	and	again	discovered	that	U	is	both	bigger	(cf.	the	development	of	cosmology)	and	smaller	(cf.	the	development	of	 particle	 physics)	 than	 we	 thought	 before.	 Considering	 that	 overall	 cosmic	pattern,	we	are	faced	with	some	inductive/abductive	reasons	to	think	there	is	no	end	in	either	direction;	dismissing	these	reasons	out	of	hand,	and	especially	on	a	priori	grounds,	seems	scientifically	and	theoretically	irresponsible.31		By	 extrapolation	 on	 the	 above	 cosmic	 pattern,	 we	 are	 simply	 forced	 to	question	whether	U	 is	 in	 fact	open	ended	 in	both	directions,	 and,	arguably,	we	have	 some	 inductive/abductive	 reason	 to	 think	 it	 is,	 no	 convincing	 reason	 to	think	it’s	not.	First,	arguably,	there	is	neither	a	convincing	a	posteriori	reason	nor	a	convincing	a	priori	reason	for	believing	that	the	cosmic	pattern	does	eventually	have	 a	 stopping	 point;	 at	 least	 none	 that	 cannot	 be	 equally	 well	 explained	 as	being	our	(hopeful)	theoretical	idealization	rather	than	a	real	existent.32	Second,	concerning	 the	 junk-direction	 in	 particular,	 there	 is,	 again	 arguably,	 neither	 a	convincing	a	posteriori	reason	nor	a	convincing	a	priori	reason	to	believe	there	is	an	all-encompassing	infinite	whole	rather	than	infinitely	many	bigger	and	bigger	wholes.33	Third,	 concerning	 the	 gunk	 direction	 in	 particular,	 there	 is,	 again	arguably,	 neither	 a	 convincing	 a	 posteriori	 reason	 nor	 a	 convincing	 a	 priori	reason	to	believe	there	are	mereological	atoms.34	Rhetorically,	why	think	an	end	point	is	anything	but	our	(hopeful)	theoretical	idealization	in	any	case?			 So,	there	are	some	reasons	to	think	the	concrete	world	is	actually	hunky,	not	 just	merely	possibly	 so.	 If	 so,	 again	assuming	SNG	appropriately	 tracks	 the	mereological	 hierarchy,	 SNG	 even	 actually	 fails	 to	 obey	WF	 (no	 matter	 which	direction	a	grounding	chain	goes).		Of	 course,	 all	 this	 leaves	 open	 whether	 there	 might	 be	 fundamentality	somewhere	else	in	the	mereological	hierarchy	than	at	the	top	or	at	the	bottom,	or	whether	 there	might	 be	 fundamentality	 in	 a	way	 that	 fails	 to	 appropriately																																																									30	Cf.	Carr	(2009).		31	See	also	Schaffer	(2003),	which	provides	a	similar	inductive	argument	for	gunk	in	particular.	Note	that,	contra	Sider	(2011,	2013),	the	above	inductive/abductive	reasons	are	not	just	a	handful	of	cases	of	unpacking	particles,	but	rather	they	are	based	on	a	much	more	general	cosmic	pattern.	Note	also	that	Sider’s	(2011,	2013)	other	criticisms	of	the	actuality	of	gunk	rest	on	the	assumptions	that	fundamentality	is	an	all-or-nothing	matter	and	that	fundamentality	is	well-founded;	both	assumptions	are	rejected	by	our	picture	of	SNG+IDG.		32	Of	course,	appealing	to	WF	at	this	point	is	a	non-starter.		33	See	Bohn	(2009b)	and	Carr	(2009).		34	See	e.g.	Arntzenius	(2008).		
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track	 the	mereological	 structures	at	 all.	Raven	 (forthcoming)	defends	one	 such	alternative,	 where	 there	 can	 be	 fundamentality	without	 a	 foundation	 a	 la	WF.	The	core	idea	is	that	fundamentality	amounts	to	ineliminability	from	a	grounding	chain,	rather	than	being	a	fact	at	an	end-point	of	it.	As	such,	there	can,	at	least	in	one	 sense,	 be	 fundamentality	 even	 if	 the	 world	 is	 hunky.	 Raven’s	 account	 is	subtle,	and	I	cannot	for	reasons	of	space	adequately	discuss	 it	here,	but	merely	note	 two	 things:	 first,	 the	 fundamental	 is	 then	not	 necessarily	 facts,	 so	we	 are	beyond	 SNG,	 and	 second,	 it	 seems	 even	 such	 a	 watered-down	 notion	 of	fundamentality	 can	 be	 indefinitely	 descending,	 leaving	 us	 with	 nothing	 truly	fundamental	at	all.35			Life	 is	short,	with	no	time	to	take	deep	breaths,	so	let’s	move	on	to	some	other	arguments.	 As	 we	 saw	 earlier,	WF	 and	 IDG	 are	mutually	 incompatible,	 so	 the	proponent	of	WF	must	deny	IDG	(and	proponents	of	IDG	must	deny	WF).	Given	that	grounding	 is	explanatory	 (as	per	SNG),	 IDG	 is	equivalent	 to	a	statement	of	what	we	might	call	the	metaphysical	principle	of	sufficient	reason	 (MPSR):	every	fact	p	has	a	metaphysical	explanation	(see	Guigon,	2014;	cf.	Della	Rocca,	2010).	So,	the	proponent	of	WF	must	deny	MPSR	too.	That	should	not	be	too	surprising:	WF	postulates	that	there	are	some	facts	that	have	no	ground,	so	by	SNG	neither	do	they	have	a	metaphysical	explanation.		But	 consider	 what	 we	 might	 call	 the	 well-founded	 grounding	 riddle:	assume	WF,	i.e.	that	all	grounding	chains	end	in	some	fundamental,	ungrounded	facts.	 Consider	 these	 ungrounded	 facts.	 Either	 they	 have	 a	 metaphysical	explanation	 (as	 per	 SNG)	 or	 they	 don’t.	 If	 they	 do,	 they	 are	 of	 course	 not	ungrounded,	in	which	case	grounding	is	not	well-founded	after	all.	If	they	don’t,	then	 they	have	no	ground.	But	 then	 the	obvious	question	arises:	whence	 these	fundamental	facts?36		Not	being	able	 to	answer	 this	question	 fails	 to	provide	a	natural	resting	
point	 for	 thought.37	There	 seems	 to	 be	 at	 least	 three	 kinds	 of	 answers.	 First,	
Brutalism:	 the	ungrounded	facts	 just	don’t	have	an	explanation,	and	there	 is	no	explanation	 for	 it	 beyond	 that.	 Second,	 Indefinitism:	 there	 are	 no	 ungrounded	facts	because	every	fact	has	an	indefinitely	descending	ground	in	all	directions,	so	the	riddle	never	arises.	Third,	Loopism:	there	are	no	ungrounded	facts	because	if	 you	 go	 far	 enough	 down	 any	 grounding	 chain	 you’ll	 end	 up	 where	 you	started.38			But	just	like	not	answering	the	above	question	is	no	natural	resting	point	for	 thought,	 so	Brutalism	 too	 is	no	natural	 resting	point	 for	 thought.	This	 is	 so	because	there	is	no	non-ad	hoc	way	to	draw	the	line	between	facts	that	do	and	do	not	 have	 a	metaphysical	 explanation,	 and	 drawing	 an	 ad	hoc	 line	 is	 surely	 no																																																									35	Raven	(forthcoming)	does	not	deny	this	second	point.		36	Note	that	this	latter	question	is	what	I	earlier	called	a	local	question	(LQ),	not	a	regional	(RQ)	or	a	global	question	(GQ).	It	resembles	the	most	common	objection	to	Aquinas’	foundationalism:	if	God	is	the	cause	of	all	things,	what	caused	God?		37	Thanks	to	Ralph	Henk	Vaags.		38	For	a	defense	of	Brutalism,	see	e.g.	Aquinas,	T.	(1266-8/1993);	Schaffer	(2009;	2010;	forthcoming);	for	a	defense	of	Loopism,	see	e.g.	Bliss	(2014);	and	for	a	defense	of	Indefinitism,	see	e.g.	Bliss	(2013);	Tahko,	(2014);	Morganti	(forthcoming);	not	to	mention	the	paper	you	are	currently	reading.	Note	that	where	I	use	‘indefinitism’,	others	use,	misleadingly	in	my	mind,	‘infinitism’.			
		 12	
natural	resting	point	for	thought	(cf.	Della	Rocca,	2010).39	So,	all	else	being	equal,	unless	 it	 contradicts	 our	 evidence,	 we	 should	 prefer	 Indefinitism	 or	 Loopism	over	Brutalism.	Assuming	the	transitivity	of	grounding,	Loopism	contradicts	the	irreflexivity	 of	 grounding,	 so	 assuming	 SNG,	 according	 to	 which	 grounding	 is	both	 transitive	 and	 irreflexive,	 Loopism	 is	 out.40	So,	 unless	 it	 contradicts	 our	evidence,	we	 should	 prefer	 Indefinitism	 over	 Brutalism.	 As	 argued	 throughout	the	 present	 paper,	 all	 else	 is	 equal	 and	 Indefinitism	 doesn’t	 contradict	 any	evidence,	 so	 we	 should	 prefer	 Indefinitism	 over	 Brutalism.	 That	 is,	 on	 our	picture,	WF	 is	Brutalism	and	 IDG	 is	 Indefinitism,	so	we	should	prefer	 IDG	over	WF.	We	have	assumed	SNG,	so	we	should	prefer	SNG+IDG	over	SNG+WF.		One	might	object	that	there	are	various	alternative	ways	one	might	try	to	explain	 the	 ungrounded	 facts,	 making	 Brutalism	 less	 brute,	 and	 thus	 a	 more	natural	resting	point	for	thought.41	For	example,	one	might	think	it	somehow	lies	in	the	essences	of	ungrounded	facts	that	they	are	ungrounded	(Rosen,	2010:128-133;	Dasgupta,	forthcoming),	which	thus	might	somehow	explain	them,	but	in	a	different	sense	from	grounding.	But	then	again,	I	say,	it	might	just	not	thus	lie	in	their	 essences;	 we	 simply	 don’t	 know	 what	 the	 ungrounded	 facts	 are,	 so	 we	simply	don’t	know	what	does	and	does	not	have	an	explanation	in	terms	of	their	essences.	 As	 far	 as	 I	 can	 tell,	 we	 simply	 have	 no	 convincing	 reason	 to	 believe	there	actually	is	such	an	alternative	explanation	of	ungrounded	facts	in	terms	of	their	essences.		Dasgupta	 (forthcoming)	 is	 perhaps	 the	 best	 attempt	 at	 this	 sort	 of	account,	 according	 to	which	both	MPSR	and	WF	are	 true,	 but	 the	 fundamental	facts	are	not	apt	 for	metaphysical	explanation.	But	the	fact	that	all	and	only	the	fundamental	 truths	 just	 happen	 to	 necessarily	 not	 be	 apt	 for	 metaphysical	explanation	is	 incredible.42	The	idea	that	ungrounded	facts	are	by	their	essence	ungrounded	is	an	interesting	idea,	but	I	just	see	no	convincing	reason	to	believe	it	is	actually	true,	not	to	mention	to	rest	the	necessity	of	SNG+WF	on	it.	The	same	goes,	 I	 say,	 in	 one	 admittedly	 too	 big	 sweep,	 for	 other	 ways	 of	 trying	 to	alternatively	explain	 the	ungrounded	(e.g.	 causally,	or	 teleologically).	 So,	 it	 still	seems	to	me	we	should	prefer	SNG+IDG	over	SNG+WF,	if	not	only	for	theoretical	purposes.		Note	that	MPSR	is	often	thought	to	entail	necessitism,	the	view	according	to	 which	 all	 actual	 facts	 are	metaphysically	 necessary	 (see	 Della	 Rocca,	 2010;	Dasgupta,	 forthcoming).	But,	as	shown	in	Guigon	(2014),	neccessitism	is	 in	 fact	no	 implication	 of	 MPSR	 as	 such,	 so	 necessitism	 is	 neither	 here	 nor	 there	 for	SNG+IDG	as	such.			Here	is	a	related	methodological	argument	for	SNG+IDG	over	SNG+WF:	all	else	being	equal,	a	theory	that	respects	MPSR	is	better	than	a	theory	that	violates	MPSR;	 there	 is	 no	 particular	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 WF	 is	 true;	 there	 is	 no	particular	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 IDG	 is	 false;	 and	 IDG	 respects	 MPSR,	 but	 WF																																																									39	On	this	point,	among	others,	it	is	worth	comparing	Brutalism	to	Epistemic	
Foundationalism,	but,	unfortunately,	I	have	no	space	to	do	so	here.	Thanks	to	Jonathan	Schaffer	and	an	anonymous	referee	for	this	volume	for	raising	this	question.		40	I	don’t	want	to	rule	out	Loopism	as	such,	but	only	for	present	purposes,	where	we	are	assuming	SNG.	Maybe	the	mental	is	grounded	in	the	physical,	but	the	physical	in	turn	is	grounded	in	the	mental.	I	find	such	a	picture	of	Loopism	well	worth	exploring.			41	Thanks	to	Jon	Litland,	Alex	Skiles	and	Kelly	Trogdon	for	pushing	me	on	this.		42	Thanks	to	Mike	Raven.		
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violates	MPSR;	 so	 the	 theory	 of	 SNG+IDG	 is	 an	 overall	 better	 theory	 than	 the	theory	of	SNG+WF.	Therefore,	 to	 the	extent	we	should	prefer	 the	better	of	 two	theories,	we	should	prefer	SNG+IDG	over	SNG+WF.43		The	first	premise	is	not	claiming	that	MPSR	is	true,	just	that	it	is	better	to	not	 violate	 it	 unless	 one	 has	 a	 good	 reason	 to.	 In	 short,	 neutrality	 and	 non-ad	
hocness	 are	 theoretical	virtues.	The	second	and	 third	premise	 is	basically	what	this	whole	section	2	of	the	paper	has	been	defending.	The	fourth	premise	is	as	we	have	 seen	 provable:	 IDG	 is	 logically	 equivalent	with	MPSR,	 and	WF	 is	 logically	
incompatible	with	IDG,	so	WF	is	also	incompatible	with	MPSR.44		Most	 generally,	 the	 proponent	 of	 WF	 faces	 the	 problem	 of	 having	 to	explain	a	non-ad	hoc	restriction	on	MPSR,	which	is	no	easy	task	(cf.	Della	Rocca,	2010).	The	proponent	of	IDG	faces	no	such	problem;	and,	at	least	for	theoretical	purposes,	to	the	extent	SNG	doesn’t	need	to	restrict	MPSR,	it	shouldn’t;	it	doesn’t	need	 to,	 so	 it	 shouldn’t.	 The	 latter	 is	 just	 good	 old	 scientific	 and	 theoretical	practice.			 Now,	 contra	 my	 methodological	 arguments	 above,	 Cameron	 (2008)	argues	 that	 SNG+WF	 is	 theoretically	 better	 than	 SNG+IDG	 because	 SNG+WF	provides	 a	 more	 unified	 theory	 than	 SNG+IDG:	 by	 WF	 there	 are	 some	fundamental	facts	in	terms	of	which	all	others	are	metaphysically	explained,	but	by	IEG	there	is	not;	and	a	more	unified	theory	is	better	than	a	less	unified	theory.	But,	why	believe	that	there	is	more	theoretical	unity	with	fundamental	facts	than	without?	First,	by	going	far	enough	down	the	grounding	chains,	there	could	be	as	much	 unity	 without	 fundamental	 facts	 as	 with.	 Second,	 the	 fundamental	 facts	might	come	in	separate	pluralities	having	little	or	nothing	in	common,	in	which	case	there	could	be	as	much	disunity	with	fundamental	facts	as	without.	That	is,	there	is	a	big	difference	between	saying	that	some	fundamental	facts	ground	all	else	 and	 saying	 that	 all	 non-fundamental	 facts	 are	 grounded	 in	 some	fundamental	facts.	The	former	might	bring	about	more	unity,	but	the	latter	need	not.	I	have	construed	things	in	terms	of	the	latter,	not	the	former.	Why	think	the	former	is	the	case?	As	far	as	I	can	tell,	SNG+WF	thus	need	not	provide	any	more	theoretical	unity	than	SNG+IDG.45						
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